Letter from Lord Somerset to Duke of Wellington
Details
Lord Somerset, a seasoned member of Parliament since 1816 wrote to the Duke of Wellington to inform him of the “false colour” the government papers were using to portray the events of the Bristol Riot of 1831.
Lord Somerset mentioned that upon Sir Wetherell’s arrival there was some disorder but no violence. Instead of dying down, this mischief continued until stone throwing engendered outright violence between the constables and rioters.
Lord Somerset emphazised that both the Recorder and the Mayor delayed the reading of the Riot Act despite pressure to do so by the Magistrates. He then proceeded to place the majority of the blame for the intensity and damage of the riots on the inadequate response to the protestors by Lieutenant-Colonel Brereton. Although initially clearing out the rioters, the next day when Mansion House was being looted and destroyed, Brereton sent the 14th Dragoon out of the city leaving it completely in the hands of the rioters from Sunday to Monday. Brereton had claimed that his troops were tired from 'shaking hands' with the rioters on Saturday and putting them back in the city would ensure their lives would be “needlessly and uselessly sacrificed”.
As a consequence, the constables who had previously declared a readiness to act if supported by the military declined to risk their lives upon hearing of Brereton’s retreat.
The damage done to the city from Saturday to Monday was estimated upwards of 300,000l. Lord Somerset mentioned that he had heard the intensity of the atrocities during the riot had generated an “anti-bill effect” (i.e., anti-reform bill) among respectable persons.
Once Major Beckwith (commanding officer of the 14th) received an express calling for his assistance, he arrived on Monday with the very same troops that Colonel Brereton had argued were too tired from shaking hands. They quickly dispersed of the rioters within two hours reducing the city to the authority of civil power once again.
Lord Somerset claimed that everyone with whom he had conversed was convinced that more rigour on the part of the mayor and “less indisposition” on the part of Brereton to obey instructions “would have saved nearly the whole damage, and the loss of some 100 or 150 persons killed”. This information is vital in helping answer two concerns previously stated in other sources. This letter helps explain the lack of action against the rioters by civil force. It also provides further clarity on the number of people who lost their lives during the Bristol Riot. Most importantly, it confirms the attempts of the government to mask the actual extent to the atrocities committed in Bristol over this notorious weekend.
Lord Somerset mentioned that upon Sir Wetherell’s arrival there was some disorder but no violence. Instead of dying down, this mischief continued until stone throwing engendered outright violence between the constables and rioters.
Lord Somerset emphazised that both the Recorder and the Mayor delayed the reading of the Riot Act despite pressure to do so by the Magistrates. He then proceeded to place the majority of the blame for the intensity and damage of the riots on the inadequate response to the protestors by Lieutenant-Colonel Brereton. Although initially clearing out the rioters, the next day when Mansion House was being looted and destroyed, Brereton sent the 14th Dragoon out of the city leaving it completely in the hands of the rioters from Sunday to Monday. Brereton had claimed that his troops were tired from 'shaking hands' with the rioters on Saturday and putting them back in the city would ensure their lives would be “needlessly and uselessly sacrificed”.
As a consequence, the constables who had previously declared a readiness to act if supported by the military declined to risk their lives upon hearing of Brereton’s retreat.
The damage done to the city from Saturday to Monday was estimated upwards of 300,000l. Lord Somerset mentioned that he had heard the intensity of the atrocities during the riot had generated an “anti-bill effect” (i.e., anti-reform bill) among respectable persons.
Once Major Beckwith (commanding officer of the 14th) received an express calling for his assistance, he arrived on Monday with the very same troops that Colonel Brereton had argued were too tired from shaking hands. They quickly dispersed of the rioters within two hours reducing the city to the authority of civil power once again.
Lord Somerset claimed that everyone with whom he had conversed was convinced that more rigour on the part of the mayor and “less indisposition” on the part of Brereton to obey instructions “would have saved nearly the whole damage, and the loss of some 100 or 150 persons killed”. This information is vital in helping answer two concerns previously stated in other sources. This letter helps explain the lack of action against the rioters by civil force. It also provides further clarity on the number of people who lost their lives during the Bristol Riot. Most importantly, it confirms the attempts of the government to mask the actual extent to the atrocities committed in Bristol over this notorious weekend.